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circumstances of the recipient. Such a system can be run and administered only by the private sector.¹¹

However, it remains to be seen if the politicians in Congress are willing to muster up courage to confront the welfare bureaucracy and act to adopt a major reform of our welfare system which will rely on the strengths of the private sector. Such a system would move government away from income distribution programs toward a program to assist those in need and help avoid dependency. If the Members of Congress are willing to take these courageous steps, the truly needy will benefit and the private sector as well as the cause of freedom will be strengthened.

Footnotes

¹Spencer Rich, "White House Study Dubs Welfare System A Failure," THE WASHINGTON POST, December 12, 1986, p. 2. An informative discussion of government monopoly and failures in the welfare system can be found in the chapter entitled "Government and the Distribution of Income," in Richard B. McKenzie and Gordon Tullock, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978, pp. 358-381.

²Ibid. Aside from the failure of the welfare system in taking resources from the private sector and making welfare a government monopoly, documented studies show that the present welfare state in the United States has not only failed to help the poor but also has made things worse for those considered disadvantaged. See Charles Murray, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, New York: Basic Books, 1984.

³Richard C. Cornuelle, RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM, New York: Random House, 1965, p. 14.

⁴Ibid., p. 15. Martin Anderson in his study of urban renewal and public housing demonstrated that urban renewal by the government has made it harder for low- and middle-income families to find homes while in the private sector development has been rapidly upgrading homes the poor can afford. See Martin Anderson, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER, Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1964.

⁵Jean Evangeloup, "War on Poverty Aided Field of Economics, Scholar Argues," THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, January 7, 1987, p. 6.

⁶"Recent Budget History and the Economic Outlook," BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FISCAL YEAR 1987, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 2-6.

⁷Dorcas R. Hardy, "An Overview of Federal Programs Affecting the Family," Remarks before the National Forum Foundation's Working Group on the Family, March 6, 1985, Washington, D.C.; National Family Forum, Volume II, No. 5, April, 1985, p. 1.

⁸George Gilder, WEALTH AND POVERTY, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981, p. 127.

⁹John C. Goodman and Michael D. Stroup, "Privatizing the Welfare State," NCPA Policy Report #123, Dallas, Texas: National Center for Policy Analysis, June, 1986, pp. 17-18.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 34-36.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1.

The Problem of Ideology In Contemporary Conservative Thought

by Lee Cheek

"The various 'isms' which have afflicted the modern state are not so much truly political phenomena as new religions. No one has managed greatly to impose the traditional classification of political societies into monarchies, oligarchies, democracies and dictatorships or tyrannies. But the new politicians are concerned with something more profound than politics; they are concerned with ideologies, that is to say, with religions, and these are dangerous and may mean . . . death."

Quintin Hogg, *The Case For Conservatism*¹

" . . . within humanity ideology is inescapable and that making it a showpiece right in the center of conservative demonology is complete nonsense.

Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Modern Age*²

I.

This paper has been given added impetus by what the author has observed to be a decline in the study of political theory; it may be the primary current affliction of our discipline and an affliction which has remained largely unencountered. Such a decline has previously exerted its Procrustean head. As Dante Germino has observed, a "decline" was evident following the influence of Hegel, which brought about a severe attack by the nineteenth-century messianic humanists.³

The abuse of ideology and ideological praxis constitutes a serious threat to political theory; the more radical forms of ideology may

indeed prove to be little more than the antithesis of political theory or what might be called political fanaticism. Political theory must by its very nature possess a sense of prudence and refrain from worshipping at the temple of rationalism. In Daniel Boorstin's wonderful little book, *The Genius of American Politics*, he attributes much of the brilliance of the American political system to its disdain for dogma and a rigid belief system; this is a valued remnant of our Anglophilic patri-mony.

Contemporary conservative thought has become embattled over the concept of ideology. Much of the debate takes neither the form of a dialogue nor a polemic; it is essentially a misconception of the term "ideology" and an exhibition of philosophical naivete. This paper will serve as an attempt to explore the potential damage an ideology with political trappings would have on the conservative intellectual movement; it will attempt to look at the history of the concept of ideology and the historic generation of the concept; and the paper will examine the theorists embroiled in the current debate and a potential resultant. Such an attempt must begin with an examination of the concept of ideology and its cognitive evolution.

II.

Ideology is one of the most debated concepts in the realm of social thought. The most frequent concern over the concept is whether its epistemological or sociological components should be stressed; others argue the analytical or cultural aspects should be given more prominence. Nevertheless, the origin of the concept was based on epistemological concerns. The term, as is generally conceded, is a product born in the coffee shops of Paris during the first few years of the 19th century.⁴ Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, who coined the term "ideology," was an eminent *philosophe* and one who came to the movement late; these late bloomers were known as *ideologues*. Destutt de Tracy believed he had invented a new science which was, in his estimation, an expansion of the study of zoology.

The *ideologues* intended their new science to serve as an element to enlighten those who still preferred metaphysical abstractions; to ask ontological questions was to engage in the most banal and useless sort of act. De Tracy's new science was to have been a basis from which to determine a "science of ideas." His predominant methodology recognized only physical sensation as the basis for all thought processes. As Kenneth Minogue describes: "Science theorized nature and a science of man was conditional upon assimilating man to nature, exploring

the higher functions in terms of the lower, the higher being taken as complex, the lower as simple."⁵

To appreciate fully the origin of the concept, the conditions which brought about its birth must be examined. De Tracy was a prisoner in the townhall at Auteuil during the Terror of 1793 through 1794.⁶ During his tenure in the jail, as he observed his friends being marched to the guillotine, de Tracy spent his hours reading Condillac and Locke. Condillac, as would de Tracy, praised his intellectual progenitors: Locke and Bacon. Condillac observed in Bacon that his introduction of the scientific method gave added impetus to the study of physical processes. Locke was canonized for his disdain for innate ideas and his concept of *tabula rasa*. Condillac observed in Locke and Bacon that knowledge was essentially a physical sensation. Fortunately for de Tracy, Thermidor Robespierre was overthrown, enabling de Tracy to conduct a study of Condillac's philosophy. De Tracy would conclude, after systematizing Condillac's work, that if one understood the physical nature of man, one could understand man's *weltanschauung*.

Destutt de Tracy proceeded to place his own mark upon this concept of ideology in his *Elements d'Ideologie*, which appeared in five volumes between 1801 and 1815. He would see sensualism as the basis of all knowledge and disregard all that was not subject to scientific investigation. This diminished the prospects of any serious analysis of contemplative theory; de Tracy's process was reductionistic in force and methodology. The *ideologues*, who claimed to be an empirical lot, were in actuality an abstract group of thinkers; however, the process they pursued removed them from the possibility of reflective appraisal.⁷ Napoleon, the greatest critic of Destutt de Tracy, would utter not a few criticisms of the *ideologues*—namely calling the group "ideologists" and arguing that they were hopelessly unaware of the true social order.

Comte would follow de Tracy's model; his argument, similar to contemporary liberation theologians like Bonino and Herzog, envisioned a future society that was not merely improved but perfected. Positivism, from a Comtean perspective, could be slowly freed from all reliance upon a philosophy of history.⁸ Comte would become involved in a famous debate with Littré involving Comte's desire to replace the traditional role of the Christian Church with a religion of humanity.⁹ A machine society—with all its morbid details, would be envisioned. Each component (person) would be expected to participate in a prescribed manner and if the component refused, the wrath of the system would be engaged. History was reduced to a system of law based in three stages; critical reflection under such a process was viewed as

unnecessary. Comte was, nevertheless, only an intermediate step in the evolution of the concept of ideology.

The most serious and arguably the most destructive evolution of the concept of ideology came with the rise of Karl Marx. Marx was a serious student of de Tracy and studied de Tracy's *Elements d'Ideologie* closely.¹⁰ The Marxist onslaught brought about the greatest attack on political theory and transcendence ever witnessed. This form of ideological attack centered on an analysis of particular evils of the moral order to aid the development of a "pure model of domination."¹¹ The early writings of Marx, which remain today the most neglected, along with the works of Engels, demonstrate how this concept of ideology was used to "generate liberation out of pure theory of social change."¹² For Marx, ideology became a theoretical catechism; for this system to be successful, it would require the destruction of all others. Marx claimed all previous theorists were simply misguided and his mission was to restore philosophy to its correct position. His attack on the old order would show the impossibility of the effort as Gerhart Niemeyer has observed:

"Their (Marx and Lenin) attack on the roots of order, however, had a totally negative character; it could destroy but not provide any new illumination of life. The Marxist-Leninist failure in this respect may demonstrate merely the impossibility of creating an ordering myth by willfully designing an intellectual formula . . . It might instruct a revolutionary enterprise in terms of historical meaning and practical goals of strategy, but it could not serve as a new myth ordering human existence."¹³

Ideas were for Marx a reflection of class expression or, in Marxian terms, class exploitation. Political philosophy became a means by which this oppression of the masses could be continued and advanced. Marx also argued for an ideology of the masses, one that would inevitably lead to revolution. Even as Marx castigated ideologies of other castes, he was earnestly building his own. While Marxism is the most widespread ideology of our age, it is merely a competitor among many.

Ideology came to us moderns as a habit; a habit by which we attempt to organize structural explanations of our world, usually a creative game of the mind aimed at solving the dilemmas that face the universe in a grand way. The concept, with its origins during the French Revolution, soon digressed into a destructive project. The term ideology is used, as Minogue points out in his book *Alien Powers*, "To denote

any doctrine which presents the hidden and saving truths about to the evils of the world in the form of social analysis. It is a feature of all such doctrines to incorporate a general theory of the mistakes of everybody else."¹⁴ Giovanni Sartori has referred to the term as pointing to "a black box."¹⁵ Given the present misunderstanding of the term, regardless of the possible distinctions of an ideology of knowledge as compared to an ideology of politics, this writer believes the term to be representative of a destructive process and indicative of the initial step by which an individual develops a destructive ideologyism.

American conservatives are confronted with a hermeneutical dilemma when considering the prospects of ideology. America has not been a fruitful soil for ideologized thought. Nearly seventy-five years ago, George Santayana wrote: "It will take some hammering to drive a coddling socialism into America."¹⁶ American conservatives, the political persuasion least likely to succumb to ideology—realizing Burke's dictum that change is the basis of preservation—are in the midst of a crisis in the present era. The American conservative intellectual movement, largely influenced by its British patrimony, in particular Burke and Disraeli, have a tradition of refraining from ideological grand designs; it suspects such all-encompassing strategies as overly simplistic and contends that such systemization is imprudent when the human condition is considered. The current debate among conservatives is as fascinating as it is complex; an attempt will be made in the next portion of this paper to look at the key actors and the arguments involved.

III.

"In the course of the past decade, the Republicans have learned that in an age of ideological parties, conservative parties have to develop a sharp ideological identity."

Irving Kristol, *Wall Street Journal* (July 17, 1980)¹⁷

Irving Kristol, a former Trotskyist turned neoconservative, would initiate the current debate over ideology among conservatives. His article, entitled "The New Republican Party," would entice some to such a call while driving still others towards near paroxysmic eruptions. When Kristol praised such a path, he could not have foreseen the upheaval which would follow. He also argued in the article that conservatives ". . . can't beat an ideology with no ideology."¹⁸ The only way to counter the left's dominance in the arena of ideas, according to Kristol, was to join the battle. He was asserting, in a sublime fashion, what he hoped would be the continued success "of neoconservative

Republicanism," exemplified by Jack Kemp, Richard Lugar and David Stockman.¹⁹ Kristol appears to lack a theoretical base from which to judge the poignancy of the term: a possible remnant from his years of Marxist studies. He has, for example, praised the American revolution as a successful revolution and a "continuing revolution"—a term first elucidated in the theories of Leon Trotsky.²⁰ Kristol's quiet, if not accidental, plea for an ideology has been a spark for the current debate. The editorial has been Kristol's major effort; even in public forums where the topic has been discussed, he has been less than willing to assert his plea.²¹ His small broadside has managed to awaken many to the controversy.

The most prominent proponent of a conservative ideology in America is not an American, but an Austrian: Erik Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn. Kuehnelt-Leddihn is a highly respected political observer and litterateur. He studied widely in Europe and has taught at a diverse lot of American universities, including Georgetown and Chestnut Hill College. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, a frequent advisor to Otto von Hapsburg, is a devout monarchist. His influence has been keenly felt in America through his frequent columns in *National Review*, his yearly lecture tours throughout the country, and in his trenchant political works.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn believes that modern man is facing a great crisis in the acquisition of knowledge and that the crisis is increasing every year. The difference he observes is the growing abyss between *Srta* (what is generally known) and *Scienda* (what should be known). He believes that Western civilization will soon be at the point where its citizens will be unable to make intelligent decisions; the idea of *Homo docens* has been lost forever.²² Modern man has been ideologically bonded as an amateur, unable to "realize facts."²³ As a corrective, we moderns must experience a transformation, albeit an ideological one, so that we may successfully confront the evil that awaits us.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn realizes Americans are predisposed against ideologies. Given our tradition of "commercialism, pragmatism and philosophic sensualism, parliamentary and democratic institutions," it is unlikely Americans will have any propensity for ideological thinking.²⁴ He agrees with those who would take a more critical view of ideology by asserting that ideology is incompatible with compromise. Americans, however, are bound by the spirit of compromise, he argues, due to the role of compromise in the bargaining process of business.

An aspect of Kuehnelt-Leddihn's disdain for democracy evolves from what he observes to be the inability of democracies to govern: in his view, the contemporary totalitarianism has its origin in democratic

principles—not the "classical liberal-libertarian" principles he espouses. For Kuehnelt-Leddihn, uniformitarian mass democracy is equal to tyranny.²⁵ This evil, per his analysis, is a product of the Reformation, if one is to follow Kuehnelt-Leddihn's intellectual genealogy. This reassertion of a long exerted continental European influence has caused much consternation in America. Kuehnelt-Leddihn's pessimistic appraisal of the West, and particularly America, pushes him to offer the only available source of survival-and ideology:

"Not only does 'Europe need an idea' but the entire embattled West, at which, for better or worse, the United States is the leader. But where does one 'get' an idea, a common idea, a whole ideology as a driving motor and rallying point? Who should and could provide it? Obviously the so-called conservatives . . . So far they have merely uttered excellent criticisms of the Left, have moaned brilliantly our decadence and have produced not much more than what the French call *de la litterature*."²⁶

He considers the current leaders of the "Right" as essentially lackluster; unable to or simply too "lazy" to offer a credible defense to the ideologies of the left. He repeats Whittaker Chamber's old concern that "the Right has no program."²⁷ Simply a disdain for Soviet style communism is no philosophy; American conservatives simply do not possess an historical consciousness, Kuehnelt-Leddihn observes that an ideology could be installed and not be *ex natura vis a vis* the American political tradition. Contrary to the critics of a conservative ideology, it is not *contre coeur*, but is in actuality the direction American conservatives must be headed.

Frequently Kuehnelt-Leddihn will bring other notables to his table; most commonly, he mentions his fellow Austrian and Noble Laureate, Friedrich August von Hayek. Hayek, a pivotal figure, along with Ludwig von Mises, in the development of the "Austrian" school of economics, has argued that if an ideology is not implanted, a disastrous "bad" ideology will prevail. Such an argument may damage Kuehnelt-Leddihn's proposals; Hayek and Mises are central figures in the libertarian movement—a sect some conservatives consider to be anathema and little more than an ideology-given the fanatic attachment of Libertarians to the notion of human freedom.

The essence of Kuehnelt-Leddihn's argument remains the necessity of having an ideology for all the world, one which would be heard by all the peoples of the world and would serve as sort of an ideological security blanket; he has proposed such a rigid set of ideas and has given the document a title, "The Portland Statement." He confesses that such a proposition, from an eschatological perspective, would

lead to a final utopia. Utopian thinking, from a traditionalistic conservative perspective, is a social arrangement impossible to achieve on earth. While one can easily differentiate between More's *Utopia* and Huxley's *Brave New World*, utopianism remains a concept unacceptable to most conservatives and Kuehnelt-Leddihn's use of the term makes his proposal less alluring—even as he remains the foremost advocate of a conservative ideology.

Recently, Robert Nisbet, an eminent conservative sociologist and author of *The Sociological Tradition* and *The Quest for Community*, has cited conservatism as one of the three major ideologies of the past two centuries.²⁸ He defines ideology as any reasonably coherent body of knowledge. For the first time in his long career, this scholar argues that conservatives must make the proverbial jump to the ideological bandwagon. He believes the use of ideology to be clear and "altogether useful."²⁹ He argues conservatives should lay aside previous conceptions of the term, regardless of their accuracy, and see ideology as a body of moral or social ideas that can be applied to the political system. Nisbet separates an ideology from social currents by stressing the permanence of an ideology; this enables it to allow for charismatic leaders occasionally-like a Burke or a Disraeli.³⁰

As far as the substance of the ideology is concerned, Nisbet says the answer lies in Eliot's definition: "(a) stratum down to which any sound political thinking must push its root and from which it must derive nourishment."³¹ It appears as if he is accepting, incipiently, a reductionalism. He is most concerned about a "common commitment" to a large "political objective."³² Such an approach begs the question of mass appeal and is the antithesis of the traditional conservative notion of variety; the appeal is little more than a rearming of the old Benthamite notion of "bigger is better." Social and political institutions, based in a grand design are the work of the *Gleichgeschichten*, or levelers. Order and classes and varying social conditions must exist if variety is to flourish. Nisbet, unlike Kuehnelt-Leddihn, praises his use of the concept of ideology with little pugnaciousness; his recent testament to the concept, *Conservatism Dream or Reality*, is little more than a pedagogical tract.

IV.

As with most debates since Adam, there is more than one perspective. Just as some conservatives have recently yearned for an enactment of an ideology, those against such a move, or at least suspicious of it, have made their case. The opponents of such an ideology would include Eric Voegelin, John Hallowell, Gerhart Nie-

meyer and Russell Kirk. Unfortunately, Voegelin's work to show how man's order of being has been formulated, remains unread by most of conservative cast. Hallowell and Niemeyer, great scholars by any account, have only devoted a limited amount of their immense intellectual resources to the question of a conservative ideology. Niemeyer, in his valuable *Between Nothingness and Paradise*, refers to ideological thought as being identical to gnostic thought—an evolution described in great detail in Voegelin's *Order and History*. He observes that ideological thought really amounts to the "subordination of contemplative theory to the *libido domandi*, which manifests itself in the building of closed systems . . ."³³ Niemeyer laments the lack of linguistic devices to identify the antithesis of ideology, but adds "philosophical" may be an adequate antonym. The forces against a conservative ideology are strong; however, the single force who has contended against a conservative ideology with the most vigor and greatest regularity is Russell Kirk.

Russell Kirk is often heralded as the central figure in the revival of reflective conservatism in the post war era. His importance is realized by his critics and students of social thought; nevertheless, his work has received relatively limited scholarly attention, with several recent exceptions.³⁴ Kirk has for more than a quarter of a century been an avid critic of the shortcomings of ideological thinking. As a theorist in the intellectual tradition of Burke and Babbitt, Kirk is not ashamed to appeal to intuition or the experience of our ancestors to offer support for the moral order; this is especially evident given Kirk's frequent lament that our age has fallen into profound disorder.

To Kirk, the "permanent things" of the commonwealth "stand in peril," due in part to the drug of ideology.³⁵ For the concept to be understood, we must look at its historic generation. Ideology is the final result of the rationalism of the Enlightenment period, an approach which attempted to put all sensual feelings into a systematic arrangement. Kirk argues that even during Destutt de Tracy's life, and certainly after, "ideology was a term of derogation, implying misguided intellectuality as banefully applied to social concerns."³⁶ Ideology for Kirk is the enemy of political philosophy. Kirk subscribes to H. Stuart Hughes' dictum of "conservatism as the negation of ideology," and urges this is the essence of the conservative response to the question.³⁷

Perhaps Kirk's greatest concern with ideology is that it destroys the moral imagination, which he sees as the key to a recovery of a harmonic social order. The moral imagination, similar to Newman's "Illative Sense," seeks to enable, not to provide for or appease. "Giant ideology," possessing a grand plan for all men, with no realization of

the power of ethical perception, could be "engaged successfully in the expiration of culture."³⁸

The promise of the ideologue—a new Eden—is more often supplanted by a terrestrial hell. In Kirk's earlier works, he identified the major ideological movements as those of the behaviorist, libertarian and liberal casts. More recently, he has been critical of those who would propose a "democratic ideology." Kirk believes a democratic ideology is really a call for a creation of a civil religion, a notion about which he is skeptical:

"If by some subtle process the approved civil religion were designed to supplant the congeries of creeds at present flourishing—why, such hostility towards belief in the transcendent is precisely the most ruinous characteristic of the existing virulent ideologies."³⁹

Kirk sees ideology as "the disease, not the cure."⁴⁰ All ideologies lead to a disruption of order and usurption of freedom and justice. Our political tradition runs counter to ideological thinking; those who are advocating a conservative ideology are merely advocating a form of fanaticism—a choice better left unmade:

"By elaborate propaganda, calculated to destroy faith in existing institutions and in lawfully constituted authority, ideology thrusts out truth and clear perception of reality from the minds of its victims. Once possessed of power, ideologues silence all rivals."⁴¹

V.

The debate over the implantation of a conservative ideology rolls on; Kuehnelt-Leddihn's "Portland Statement" serves as the most prominent example. The end to this "problem" will not come soon; the vigor of the debate has only recently begun to assert itself. As the debate continues, the philosophical sophistication and level of debate will increase. Given the utter impracticality of fusionist models, the increased dialogue is essential. American conservatives possessed no coordinated intellectual force following the Second World War; today their ranks have surged in number. This occurrence may require sailing around the gulf of ideology, to a more traditional position.

Footnotes

¹Quintin Hogg, *The Case For Conservatism* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1948), p. 47.

²Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "Utopias and Ideologies," *Modern Age*, Volume 21, Number 3 (Summer 1977), p. 237.

³Dante Germino, *Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 45.

⁴Russell Kirk, "The Unnatural History of Giant Ideology," *Chronicles*, April 1986, p. 18.

⁵Kenneth Minogue, *Allen Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 19.

⁶Barry Cooper, "Ideology, Technology and Truth," *The Ethical Dimension of Political Life: Essays in Honor of John Hallowell* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983), p. 142.

⁷Germino, *ibid*, p. 51.

⁸Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harvest Books, 1936), p. 139.

⁹Dante Germino's work, previously cited, provides much information concerning Comte.

¹⁰Germino, *ibid*, p. 57.

¹¹Minogue, *ibid*, p. 51.

¹²Minogue, *ibid*, p. 4.

¹³Gerhart Niemeyer, *Between Nothing and Paradise* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 202.

¹⁴Minogue, p. 121.

¹⁵Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 63, Number 2 (June 1969).

¹⁶Russell Kirk, *The Enemies of the Permanent Things* (LaSalle, Illinois: Sherwood Sugden and Company, 1984), p. 165.

¹⁷Irving Kristol, "The New Republican Party," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 July 1980, p. 22.

¹⁸Kristol, *ibid*, p. 22.

¹⁹Kristol, *ibid*, p. 22.

²⁰Irving Kristol, "The American Revolution As a Successful Revolution" (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1973).

²¹Interview with Annette Kirk, March 12, 1987.

²²Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "Scita Et Scienda: The Dwarfing of Modern Man," *Imprimis*, Volume 3, Number 10 (October 1974).

²³Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Modern Age*, *ibid*, p. 267.

²⁴Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Modern Age*, *ibid*, p. 267.

²⁵George Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 64.

²⁶Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Modern Age*, *ibid*, p. 273.

²⁷Personal Interview with Kuehnelt-Leddihn, November 1984.

²⁸Robert Nisbet, *Conservatism: Dream and Reality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), preface.

²⁹Robert Nisbet, *ibid*, preface.

³⁰Robert Nisbet, *ibid*, preface.

³¹Robert Nisbet, *ibid*, preface.

³²Robert Nisbet, *ibid*, preface.

³³Niemeyer, *ibid*, p. 142.

³⁴W. Wesley McDonald's upcoming intellectual study of Kirk, to be published by the National Humanities Institute, along with John East's recent *The American Conservative Movement*, will help fill this void.

³⁵Kirk, *Enemies*, *ibid*, p. 153.

³⁶Kirk, *Enemies*, *ibid*, p. 155.

³⁷Kirk, "Unnatural," *ibid*, p. 19.

³⁸Kirk, "Unnatural," *ibid*, p. 20.

³⁹Kirk, "Unnatural," *ibid*, p. 20.

⁴⁰Kirk, "Unnatural," *ibid*, p. 20.

⁴¹Kirk, *Enemies*, *ibid*, p. 147.